The were accustomed to physical theory being deterministic. Compatibilism does not maintain that humans are free. Under Determinism, two more positions conflict, Compatibilism and Incompatibilism. Compatibilism is an old viewpoint from previous centuries when philosophers were talking about free will. Problem of moral responsibility, the problem of reconciling the belief that people are morally responsible for what they do with the apparent fact that humans do not have free will because their actions are causally determined.It is an ancient and enduring philosophical puzzle. The fact that modern philosophical compatibilist re-define free will outside of the classical semantics (that are important today) is the very problem with compatibilism. The problems that arise if one attempts to mix the two views are illustrated in section 4 by means of the paradox that both the assumption and the denial of determinism lead to the conclusion that there cannot be responsibility based on free will.
Compatibilism is an old viewpoint from previous centuries when philosophers were talking about free will. Compatibilism. It is an "anti-compatibilism" that is more subtle than the question of the existence of free will or determinism. A few things jump out. Habermas discusses compatibilism as one of two strategies for showing that the observer and the participant perspective can, in principle, be reconciled while acknowledging that we can and must understand ourselves as part of nature. Immanuel Kant called it "wretched subterfuge" and "petty word-jugglery." The problem of causal exclusion, like many philosophical problems, is simultaneously about matters metaphysical and about the conceptual/semantic workings of certain philosophically important concepts and terms.
The were accustomed to physical theory being deterministic. Soft determinism (or compatibilism) is the position or view that causal determinism is true, but we still act as free, morally responsible agents when, in the absence of external constraints, our actions are caused by our desires. There is no alternative, except to deny the faith. You seem to be mixing up compatibilism and hard determinism, which are two very different positions.
Some philosophers have recently argued that luck at the time of decision is a problem for compatibilists and libertarians alike. The problem is that we don't have free will; our actions are entirely caused by external factors. Compatibilism – the belief that free will is … But conceptual ambiguity regarding deterministic luck at the time of decision – henceforth C-luck – has obscured recognition of the problem C-luck poses to compatibilism.