Still, Chalmers is among those most responsible for the outpouring of work on this issue. David Chalmers coined the name “hard problem” (1995, 1996), but the problem is not wholly new, being a key element of the venerable mind-body problem. I think that the idea of a hard problem of consciousness arises from a category mistake. So, for example, if mechanisms that explain how the brain integrates information are discovered, then the first of the easy problems listed would be solved. The philosopher David Chalmers, who introduced the term "hard problem" of consciousness, contrasts this with the "easy problems" of explaining the ability to discriminate, integrate information, report mental st… One is ontological; the other is epistemological. The hard problem of consciousness consists of two separate problems.
If you look at the brain from the outside you see this extraordinary machine – an organ consisting of 84 billion neurons that fire in synchrony with each other. The hard problem of consciousness is a problem of how physical processes in the brain give rise to the subjective experiences of the mind and of the world. Such phenomena are functionally definable. Like the hard problem of consciousness, the hard problem of matter cannot be solved by experiment and observation or by gathering more physical detail. I think that in fact there is no real distinction between hard and easy problems of consciousness, and the illusion that there is one is caused by the pseudo-profundity that often accompanies category mistakes. Likewise, we can tell a priori whether a given thing has consciousness because no things have (the philosopher's kind of) consciousness. The problem arises because “phenomenal consciousness,” consciousness characterized in terms of “what it’s like for the subject,” fails to succumb to the standard sort of functional explanation successful elsewhere in psychology (compare Block 1995). The hard problem contrasts with so-called easy problems, such as explaining how the brain integrates information, categorizes and discriminates environmental stimuli, or focuses attention. There's no hard problem of consciousness because phenomenal consciousness doesn't exist. The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why and how sentient organisms have qualia or phenomenal experiences—how and why it is that some internal states are subjective, felt states, such as heat or cold, rather than objective states, as in the workings of a thermostat or a toaster. The hard problem of matter arises for any structural description of reality no matter how clear and intuitive at the structural level. There are not one, but two hard problems of experiential consciousness. That is, roughly put, they are definable in terms of what they allow a subject to do. Zombies are conceivable, and in fact, we are zombies. ... (the combination problem, etc. The hard problem of consciousness consists of two separate problems.
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